Friday, August 23, 2013


Take the assertion that a noun sometimes can be said to refer to an object but that a conjunction never does.

No one would construe that statement for a scientific or a metaphysical assertion.

But if I said that if we pay careful attention/ that sometimes when I use a noun in a sentence we can see that it stands for an object/ but at other times/ no such object can be found (even though it is a noun).

It might sound as if I was making a scientific or metaphysical claim.  Like if I said that in order to use the verb "to think" meaningfully in a sentence/ there would have to be subject/ but that we might not be able to establish who the subject referred to.

The Stumbles of the Philosophers

You had it all backwards.

You wanted us to believe that the mind is the mirror of the world.

Instead/ it appears that the soul is the mirror of God.

Isn't the sensible always the best picture of the insensible?

Then how did you conceive very clearly and very distinctly that the invisible could picture what is visible?