Theological "Truths"

I was watching an atheist clip the other day, and he was talking about how the fact that X number of people were willing to give their lives for the preservation of their religious tradition did not make it true.  It occurred to me that what I was hearing was a man who has a conception of truth that is radically different from the conception of truth found in many religious traditions.  Thus, he was not refuting an argument, he was imposing his conception of truth, and pointing out that martyrdom does not equate to truth under his conception.  Thus, he was not refuting the Truth of God, he was substituting his own truth in the place of God's Truth, as it has been articulated by God's followers.

This was interesting to me, not because I want to convince anyone that either side is correct, but because it presented a translation problem.  We have two rival conceptions of a concept, two sides advancing arguments, but misunderstanding of what each other is presupposing as their first principles.

Let's start with our atheist debater.  Although he didn't quite come out and say it, I surmise that his conception of truth is something like the following:  A statement is true if and only if it is true.  This is the correspondence theory of truth, a statement is true if it corresponds to reality.  Further, this correspondence is determined by empirical observation of reality.  In this sense, the fact that I subjectively believe something is true does not make it true, only the fact that it corresponds to this objective reality.  Thus, even if I die the death of a martyr, that does not make my belief true.

Of course, this correspondence theory has limited utility outside of very narrow empirical investigations.  For example, is it true that gravity exists, or that evolutionary theory is true?  In the first instance, no one has ever observed gravity, only its effects, so it is not true that gravity exists.  The theory of gravity is just a useful tool for making predictions about future observable events.  Likewise, the status of evolution is even shakier.  Evolution does not make any firm predictions about anything, it explains a historical fact of speciation.  In as much as there may very well emerge new species, it may be that someone can say that evolution makes predictions about how those species will come to be, but it is clear that evolution does not actually make any specific
predictions about future species, any more than astrology does.  My evolutionary friends are going to object to this way of formulating it, but the fact remains that evolution does not predict when a new species will happen, or what form the new species will take or anything of the sort.  It is a hand-waving sort of explanation, which should trouble some people, but does not.

Unlike gravity, evolution does not really make testable predictions, rather, it provides a narrative trope or a framework for talking about historical patterns.  At the same time, I am fudging it a bit, in population genetics, scientists will use probability models to predict genetic (and phenotypical) incidences in future generations, and these predictions are testable.  But is this really evolutionary theory (e.g. an explanation of the origin of species) or is this merely applying mathematical models to genetics?  Lets just say the theory of evolution makes a domain more intelligible than it might otherwise be, and that evolution can be teased into something like a predictive theory in certain contexts, radically inferior if judged in light of Newton's Law of Gravity. In any event, evolution is not true, it is merely useful.

We can consider mathematics, which is not empirical.  Mathematics is simply a kind of language, or a kind of activity that human beings engage in, but which happens to have practical applications to the empirical world.  A mathematical truth is not empirical, for example, we don't have to calculate what "2+2" equals on the moon to be assured it equals "4" on the moon as well as on Earth.  But notice my atheist friend cannot account for why mathematical truths can be said to be true.  Of course, we can engage in a little Platonic mythology, and talk about the transcendent eternal plane of Numbers, and that our little terrestrial operations correspond to these scared, eternal truths on the Platonic dimension.  But lets think about this one, shall we?  Let's say our little account were true, that there was this invisible realm, and that when I calculated my numbers, my result corresponded to this invisible Platonic structure.  How would I know such a thing?  How would I transmit such knowledge to my child?  How could I know that I knew such a thing? Do I know these things, or do I have a picture (or a model) that I derived from discussing propositions about empirical states of affairs, that I am now trying to impose on mathematical truths?

I should like to break out of this dilemma by suggesting that mathematical truths are true on the basis of convention.  Humans devise certain rules or procedures, and explore those procedures--we can compare it to the invention of the game of chess.  As humans explore these systems of procedures, we come up against certain possibilities, for example, division by zero yields one result when we use one procedure and another result by another procedure, so we make a rule that you cannot divide by zero.  Note that what makes mathematical truths true is that there is a uniform consensus of persons on the general rules of mathematics.  Thus, it is not up to an individual to decide what is or is not true in mathematics, but it is up to the consensus of a community.  For example, I can establish a mathematical proof of a certain theorem to my own satisfaction, but the theorem is not proved unless or until the community deems the proof to be valid.  Notwithstanding that mathematical truths are social facts, not empirical facts, this does not detract from the utility of various systems of mathematics.  Moreover, the fact that there are different means of constructing mathematical systems (for example, Euclidean versus Non-Euclidean geometries), this does not matter so long as the there are empirical applications.  That is to say, mathematics may be better viewed as a tool, a means of representation, rather than some super-essential structure of the universe.

But returning to our correspondence theory of truth, it is pretty clear that we cannot gain any insight into mathematical truths from our correspondence theory, we are just left with some silly Platonist mythology which we are not able to connect up with a human epistemology or an empirical world.  So whatever we want to say about truth, it is not clearly a correspondence with empirical reality, and a correspondence with some metaphysical reality does not clarify anything.  It is like saying that because the word "unicorn" has a meaning, there has to be an imaginary world which is populated with unicorns, in the same way that for "cow" to have a meaning, there has to be a real world populated by cows.  But I have a means of teaching a child to use the term "cow" which includes pointing to real animals called "cows".  I can't do this with a "unicorn"--but we might have a way of understanding how "unicorn" can refer to something:  it can refer to an image.  But I cannot point to a "unicorn" in some alternative metaphysical realm.  We are using a certain model of truth and then insisting that our practices be made to fit into this model.  The truth of mathematics are social truths, and it is clear that we have to acknowledge two ontological levels:  one of the community, and one of the individual.  The truths of mathematics express a communal order, a norm of expression within a certain group.  On the other hand, the truths of mathematics do not express an individual order, as the individual can believe him or herself to be right, but can be wrong.  The community, on the other hand, cannot be wrong (unless it decides in the future that it was wrong in the past).  The task of the individual, in as much as the individual wants to succeed at mathematics, is not to be certain, but to conform to the rule of the community.  But why does the community want to preserve this system of norms and rules, and why does the individual want to conform to this system?  Presumably, because both the individual and the community perceive mathematics to be a good, or to result in a good.  After all, being an IV drug user also involves being a member of a certain community and conforming to the norms of that community, but none-the-less most people support the suppression of IV drug use because they perceive the end of the community to be evil.

A social fact implies the existence of a community unified by a set of rules and practices (which reflect communal norms) and which exists for some purpose.  Where there are communal norms (unspoken conventions of behavior) or communal rules and practices (verbal conventions embodied in conventions of behavior), there is a purpose.  In fact, this is the general structure for organization of a complex system.  A system of signals and conventions of behavior which can be socially transmitted to new persons, and which provides for positive and negative reinforcement of individuals.  Although this is true of human social behavior, I suspect, without being able to empirically establish, that this structure replicates itself downwards to all levels of self-organizing behavior.  Activity unifies many parts toward a directed goal, employing norms of behavior and, on occasion, symbols.  From this standpoint, life is not something contained within a physical matrix, but something symbolized through a physical matrix.  Thus, we should not be surprised that we cannot get far understanding mathematics from a reductive or mechanical framework, as the truths of mathematics can only be understood as manifesting the correspondence between one ontological level of reality to a higher level of reality.  [Speaking from the Platonic perspective, the higher level is higher because it makes the lower level intelligible.]  I think we can also understand where the notion of free will raises itself:  a goal directed lower order can either be integrated or oriented within the goals (and norms) of a higher order, or the lower order can deviate from the higher order.  Without positing a hierarchy of ontological levels, and a system of communication and punishment, it is hard to conceptualize what is involved in free will.

At the same time, we have a problem, because these different levels of reality cannot be fully differentiated.  Our mathematician is part of the community of mathematicians, and the community of mathematicians includes our mathematician.  Thus, we can make no ultimate division between the mathematician and the community, the way we can make one between our subjective belief about the weather and the actual condition of the weather.  The truths of mathematics are not true independent of mathematicians, but at the same time, a truth of mathematics is not true because one mathematician believes it.  There are truths of mathematics because all mathematicians agree, but if there were no mathematicians, or they were incapable of reaching agreement on anything, there could be no mathematics.  We have spoken previously of powers and effects.  Clearly most people, as a potency, the capacity to learn mathematics.  But everyone does not have the power to actually do advanced mathematics.  How can this potency be understood, except as a capacity to be able to develop to the point that one can do something.  Moreover, this doing of mathematics, it cannot be understood as a private activity, but as participating in a collective form of life.  This potency is the capacity to become part of something greater than simply one's self, through conforming to the rule of the community.

This discussion should cause us to come back to our simple "correspondence" theory, to point out that it has problems even in our empirical domain.  After all, "It is raining" is not true based on our observation, as we can be mistaken, or hallucinating, or delusional.  Rather, whether it is raining or not is ultimately the result of a communal consensus, not merely an individual.  Otherwise, there would be no difference between believing that I confirmed it was raining, and actually confirming that it was raining.  Thus, ultimately, we must reject our distinction between empirical truths and social truths.  There are only social truths.  Moreover, the relationship between an individual and a community cannot ultimately be rationally analyzed, because an individual cannot ultimately be segregated out from the community.   The communal norm forms the judgments of the members of the community.  The further we push our analysis of the truth, the clearer it becomes that we are never going to ultimately define the truth, except in this sense of the lower order of reality corresponding with the higher order of reality.  The lower order does not describe the higher order (as the higher order makes the lower order intelligible), the lower order expresses or shows the higher order.

Here we get to the notion of God.  If truth in the ultimate analysis is social, reflecting a correspondence of the judgment of an individual with a system of group norms, rules and behaviors, then power exercised in accordance with justice, authority, manifests truth.  On the other hand, even if power is exercised in accordance with the selfish ends of the control group, without concern for the subjects, although power dispenses with justice, power still retains the capacity to compel assent.  That is, the individual or group with power has the capacity to compel the assent of the subject individuals.  Stalin says it is true, and you repeat that it is true.  Subjectivity is ordered by an inter-subjective order of power, but if there is to be a traditional understanding of truth, beyond simple conformity to a system of power, then inter-subjectivity must be ordered by some power beyond itself.  That is to say, justice, the shared norms above the group, uniting the group.  Authority is the exercise of power in accordance with justice, which is above power.  The modern obsession with power, and limiting power, proves to be a chimera.  Since all complex orders are hierarchical, simply shifting the identity of the control group does nothing to make the system any fairer.  The real issue is not power, but the absence of justice.  So long as justice remains uncorrupted, the order is stable, whether it is administered by representatives of the bourgeois or representatives of the proletariat.

Because power interprets the meaning of the laws, the symbolic content of the law does nothing to restrain power.  If power is to be exercised justly, leaders must exercise self-restraint.  To the extent that a leader can exercise self-restraint, the laws will be just.  Thus, more than fetishizing positive legal symbols, in order to have a just or sound order, leaders must be educated in the virtues and demonstrate sound moral character.  If one looks historically at authoritarian regimes, historical divergences can be explained in large part based on the character of the leader: a Bismark can always be contrasted with a Hitler or a Bonaparte in main measure due to Bismark's virtue.  If mass movements supporting dictatorships do a poor job in selecting leaders, the principle of heredity does not seem to guarantee much success either.  For this reason, provided a people posses sufficient collective virtue to support it, a Republic serves better than a Monarchy, as a Republic combines features of both a Monarchy and an Oligarchy.  A Parliamentary system is more consistent than monarchy (if more mediocre) because even though a member stands for election, the structural forces in the society (mass media, monied interests) can exert influence on the Parliament no matter who wins or loses.  Parliament allows for oligarchical control and democratic legitimacy.  Thus, the Republic, with a unitary executive and a congressional body allows for a balance.  In times of a strong, decisive executive, the Republic exhibits characteristics of the Monarchy, whereas in times of a weak, ineffectual executive, the Republic reverts to the consistent mediocrity of Oligarchy.        

In considering our leader, we must posit an ideal from which our actual leader deviates.  For this ideal leader, all exercise of power will be in keeping with the norms of the community.  What he or she does will be just.  What he or she knows will be true.  That is, we have to postulate an ideal subject, which embodies authority, in which knowing and being are unified, e.g. what it thinks is, and what is is what it thinks.  In this sense, power, knowledge and truth are unified in this subject, and this subject unifies all creation.  If we postulate this ideal subject, then we can conceptualize how a community can be ultimately wrong.  Stalin may define knowledge, and he may define what is true, but for all that, he lacks the capacity to make it true.  Because of this disparity, Stalin's power, and therefore his knowledge, is limited.  On the other hand, the Sovereign of the Universe is not limited in any fashion.  In this sense, the truth of a social order is given by its correspondence with the higher ontological level, it is true in as much as it is just.       

If we consider the game of chess, we recognize that we are dealing with a complex system involving rules which expresses a competitive purpose.  One wants to best one's opponent.  Who wins the game of chess?  If we think strategically, we can say that the structure of the game affords certain strategic advantages, and the player who can see these advantages can triumph over a weaker opponent, regardless of how the opponent actually plays.  The strategy emerges from the structure created by the system, and the one who sees more clearly, comprehends or intuits the relative benefits of various chess positions.  Rules create a purpose-driven activity, but rules in combination with physical limitations create strategic possibilities within the system.  Likewise, war and politics may be viewed as a game, and to the extent that both war and politics are driven by ends, they are limited by rules and norms.  The outcome of a battle rests on the laws of physics, but above and beyond the laws of physics, the battle rests on the morale, the level of cooperation between troops, on the abilities of the generals, etc.  A good general must not only see the purely material dimension of the battle, but these truths which are revealed in the higher orders of things.

We can contrast war and politics.  Politics is a contest between two groups or factions for domination, but a political contest always occurs within certain bounds.  Even if a form of politics includes assassinations or poisonings, these aggressions are targeted at specific individuals.  On the other hand, in war, enmity is unbounded, and in many instances, the victor has annihilated the vanquished.  Who we are in terms of nationality is directly or indirectly the result of human warfare.  What language we speak, or even what religion we practice is directly or indirectly the result of human warfare.  I would submit that war defines humanity, humanity does not define war.  We speak of "ending the cycle of violence" but the cycle of violence can have no clear end.  We can only suppress the cycle of violence, and only for a limited period time, in a limited area of territorial control.  Without order, violence inevitably raises its ugly head, and no human order is everlasting.  Human beings are not ultimately in control of their destinies, any more than the outcome of conflicts between relative equals are assured.  A conflict between two rival human orders can only be resolved by an order above both.  We say "One Nation, Under God" for a reason, because a nation can only exist so long as it is a unified order, and it can preserve itself and its territory in battle.  If we read the Old Testament, it is clear that it is God that grants salvation, victory in Battle, to his Chosen People.

I have a theory about the psychological and sociological origins of modern atheism.  If we accept that human beings are defined by an order beyond themselves, which ultimately culminates in God, then God brings wars and God decides wars.  In an age of massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons, it is clear that God can, in a pretty direct way, destroy modern society in the span of approximately 3 minutes.  It would be splendid if we really thought human beings were fantastic and beautiful, and that modern society could not possibly warrant total destruction.   But there it is, isn't it?  We probably on some level realize that we deserve destruction.  Well, God has both the means, and a damn good motive.  Moreover, there is even an expressed Biblical intent to destroy the world by fire.  It would be a whole lot nicer to believe that human beings could control warfare, that human beings could limit warfare, that we could make a world in which warfare never happened, that all these weapons never got used.  But notice that humanity has never been able to even wholesale limit the production of these weapons, and reductions between the United States and Russia have never significantly limited the nuclear capacity of either Nation.  Why should we suppose anyone would pull back in the event of reasonable provocation?  The real existence of God is horrifying in the extreme--God is in control, and we have, in our arrogance, developed the means for our own slaughter by the Sovereign.  He sent us out to fetch a switch, so we brought back a thermonuclear arsenal.  Better to deny the existence of God, and engage in acts of sacrilege to assure ourselves there is "no one up there".  Surely it could not be unmerited mercy that stays his Hand?

I, as a grim realist, must confess that the existence of hierarchical orders is an irreducible feature of our world, as expressed in language and social structures.  Further, all human hierarchies are answerable to a power outside of themselves.  Whether we call it God or Justice or Judgment, all Nations enjoy peace and victory only on account of powers beyond themselves.  Nor would I claim that victory goes only to the just.  The wicked are punished, but the good are also tested.  The arc of history tends to Justice, but it can be a very long bend during which time we can only persevere in faith and prepare in hope for a meeker future.

So we return to the argument that God exists based on the willingness of his followers to die for their faith.  If we understand that the ultimate truth is not something that you can measure on an instrument panel, but a trust in something that will insure the survival of your group in the face of the ultimate testing ground of human existence, war and death, then I think we have to look at the theistic argument differently.  After all, we spoke of those who in chess could see more clearly than their opponents, and who understood more clearly what the right move was.  In chess, one can only determine the soundness of a move at the end of the game.  In the game of life, it is unclear how we can judge whether a person's decision to embrace martyrdom is a wise or a foolish decision.  We have rejected the notion that a mathematical truth is a description of some invisible metaphysical reality, likewise, we must reject the notion that theology serves as a description of some invisible metaphysical reality.  Rather, a human being cries out in fear and trembling when the meet the face of God, the Judge of Judges, the King of Kings.  We cannot understand theology as descriptions, but rather expressions of the awesomeness and greatness that is beyond words.  To encounter someone so powerful, so magnificent, that obedience and trust in that person superseded any punishment a Magistrate or an Emperor could dish out--that would be an encounter with Truth.  Moreover, their death would manifest that encounter with Truth to those persons from whose eyes that the scales had fallen off.

Who is afraid of the Truth?  Not the one who is willing to die for it.  Not the one seeking to live for it.  Only the one who lives in variance with the Truth would fear encountering it.  The Truth, in so much as it exists, is an existential Truth, it orders our lives, our minds, our families, our communities, our nations.  The source of meaning cannot be described in words, because if words could signify it, the words would have to be outside it, that is the words would have to be meaningless.  I can signify a cat with the word "cat", because the word "cat" is wholly separate and distinct from a cat.  God is the source of the cosmic system of meaning, which contains all language.  Language cannot then refer to God and remain language.  The lower order participates within the higher order.  Language can only express or reveal God in the world, and to see God's Revelation is to see the Glory of God manifest in the world.  Left to ourselves, we cannot even pray without the intercession of God.  God calls us by name, we do not call on God.  When God calls us face to face, and one responds without fear or hesitation to God's call, then we have evidence of a Soul who has encountered God before and made peace.  Thus, martyrdom is a witness to Truth, but a Truth which by nature cannot be reduced to a description.